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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Brandon L. Peak*
Ramsey Prather **
Joseph M. Colwell ***
Christopher B. McDaniel ****
Rory A. Weeks *****
and Michael F. Williford ******
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses selected opinions and legislation of interest to
the Georgia civil trial practitioner issued during the Survey period of this
publication. 1
* Partner of Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. The Citadel (B.S., summa cum laude, 2001);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Partner of Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. New York University (B.A., magna cum laude,
2005); Tulane University Law School (J.D., magna cum laude, 2010). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate of Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. Mercer University (B.A., cum laude, 2010);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2013). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
**** Associate of Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. Columbus State University (B.A., summa
cum laude, 2010); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2014). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
***** Associate of Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. University of Georgia (A.B., cum laude,
2008); University of Georgia (M.A., 2012); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., magna
cum laude, 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
****** Associate of Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. Excelsior College (B.A., cum laude, 2013);
Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2017). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure during the prior Survey period,
see Brandon L. Peak, Joseph M. Colwell, Christopher B. McDaniel, Rory A. Weeks, Ramsey
B. Prather, and Michael F. Williford, Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 71 Mercer L. Rev. 305 (2019).
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II. LEGISLATION
This was an unusual year for the Georgia General Assembly. Due to
the COVID-19 pandemic, the legislative session was suspended
indefinitely on March 14, 2020, when Governor Kemp declared a Public
Health State of Emergency and after only twenty-nine days of the session
had been completed. Except for two special sessions convened in March
and April, the General Assembly did not resume its regular session until
June 15. Despite technically falling outside the Survey period of this
publication, the Authors have included a discussion here of Senate Bill
359 2 which was passed during the resumed 2019–2020 regular session
and because it impacts Georgia civil trial practice and procedure.
Senate Bill 359, known as the “Georgia COVID-19 Pandemic
Business Safety Act,” generally establishes immunity from tort liability
for claims arising out of exposure to COVID-19 or receiving medical
treatment for COVID-19. 3 Senate Bill 359’s immunity provision is not
limited to healthcare workers, healthcare facilities, or the provision of
health care; it also extends broadly to any business that continued to
operate during the pandemic. 4 To overcome the immunity from tort
liability falling within the scope of the Act, a plaintiff has to prove “gross
negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, reckless infliction of harm, or
intentional infliction of harm.” 5 Senate Bill 359’s immunity provision will
apply to causes of action accruing until, but not after, July 14, 2021. 6
III. CASE LAW
A. Apportionment
In Suzuki Motor of America, Inc. v. Johns, 7 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to permit a jury to consider the
fault of a motorcycle operator for purposes of apportionment in a strict
products liability case against the motorcycle manufacturer. 8 The
plaintiffs (a husband and wife) asserted a strict products liability claim
against Suzuki after the husband/operator suffered injuries in a
motorcycle crash, claiming a design defect existed in the motorcycle’s

2 Ga. S. Bill 359, Reg. Sess., 2020 Ga. Laws 588 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 51-16-1 through
51-16-5 (2020)).
3 Id.
4 Id. at §§ 1, 3.
5 Id. at § 3 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-16-2(a) (2020)).
6 Id. at § 4.
7 351 Ga. App. 186, 830 S.E.2d 549 (2019), cert. granted, Case No. A19A0109 (Jan. 13,
2020).
8 Id. at 198–99, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
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front brake piston. 9 The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but it
apportioned forty-nine percent of the fault to the husband/operator. 10 The
plaintiffs appealed the judgment because the trial court “erred by
apportioning the damage award on . . . [the plaintiff/operator’s] strict
liability claim.” 11
The plaintiff/operator purchased the motorcycle in 2005. In 2013, the
plaintiff/operator discovered the motorcycle had “spongy” brakes. His
father-in-law, a certified motorcycle mechanic, advised the
plaintiff/operator to “bleed the brakes.” 12 The plaintiff/operator did so,
“and the problem appeared to be resolved” based on short test rides that
weekend. 13 The following Monday morning, the plaintiff/operator drove
the motorcycle to work. When a tractor-trailer pulled out in front of him,
the plaintiff/operator’s front brakes failed. The plaintiff/operator skidded,
hit a curb, and was thrown from the bike, resulting in serious injuries. 14
After rehabilitation and multiple surgeries, the plaintiff/operator
“received a recall notice from Suzuki warning him of a dangerous safety
defect in his motorcycle’s front brake master cylinder.” 15
At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of a design defect in the
brakes. 16 The defendants presented evidence that the plaintiff/operator’s
injuries were caused by his negligent operation of the motorcycle, or
alternatively, by his failure to adhere to the manufacturer’s prescribed
brake-maintenance schedule. 17 The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs
but apportioned forty-nine percent of the fault to the plaintiff/operator. 18
In affirming the trial court’s decision to reduce the verdict amount by
the percentage of fault apportioned to the plaintiff/operator pursuant to
Georgia’s apportionment statute, the court of appeals relied upon the
Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling in Couch v. Red Roof Inns, 19 where the
supreme court held that Georgia’s apportionment statute displaced the
common law of apportionment. 20 Recognizing that the Couch decision
addressed whether the apportionment statute displaced the common law
rule against apportioning fault in intentional tort cases, the court of
appeals nevertheless held that the plain language of the apportionment
Id. at 188, 830 S.E.2d at 553–54.
Id. at 189, 830 S.E.2d at 554.
11 Id. at 187, 830 S.E.2d at 553.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 187–88, 803 S.E.2d at 553.
15 Id. at 188, 830 S.E.2d at 553.
16 Id. at 188–89, 830 S.E.2d at 554.
17 Id. at 189, 830 S.E.2d at 554.
18 Id.
19 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
20 Id. at 364, 729 S.E.2d at 382–83.
9

10
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statute extends to strict liability cases because the statute does not
“distinguish[] between . . . theories upon which . . . claims are premised,”
and the Georgia General Assembly failed to otherwise exclude strict
liability claims from the broad language of the statute. 21
B. Default and Default Judgment
In Bowen v. Savoy, 22 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a
defendant is not required to provide a reasonable explanation for its
failure to file a timely answer in order to meet the “proper case” standard
for opening default under Section 9-11-55(b) 23 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.). 24 The plaintiff in Bowen, as executor of
her mother’s estate, filed suit against her sisters, alleging they colluded
to misappropriate funds from the estate. The defendants were served and
filed a motion to dismiss only, sending the case into automatic default
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) 25 when they failed, as required by
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a), 26 to answer the complaint within thirty days after
service. 27
The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss six months later.
The defendants thereafter filed an untimely answer. The plaintiff moved
for entry of a default judgment and the defendants moved to set aside the
default, arguing that a proper case had been made for opening default
where their attorney filed a sworn affidavit stating he had failed to file a
timely answer due to “his good faith (mis)understanding [of] the Civil
Practice Act.” 28
After granting the motion for default judgment and denying the
defendants’ motion to set aside the default, the trial court issued a
certificate of immediate review. 29 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s judgment because “some reasonable explanation was required to
open . . . default under the ‘proper case’ ground.” 30
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b) grants the trial court discretion to open a
default at any time before the entry of a final judgment where the
defendant pays costs and demonstrates “providential cause,” “excusable
neglect,” or where the judge determines that a “proper case” has been
Suzuki, 351 Ga. App. at 198, 830 S.E.2d at 560.
308 Ga. 204, 839 S.E.2d 546 (2020).
23 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b) (2020).
24 Bowen, 308 Ga. at 208, 839 S.E.2d at 550.
25 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(a) (2020).
26 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(a) (2020).
27 Bowen, 308 Ga. at 204, 839 S.E.2d at 547.
28 Id. at 204–05, 839 S.E.2d at 547–48.
29 Id. at 205, 839 S.E.2d at 548.
30 Id.
21
22
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made. 31 The supreme court granted certiorari in Bowen to decide whether
a “reasonable explanation” is required to show a “proper case” for opening
default. 32
The court noted “that the proper case ground [for opening default] is
the broadest of the three and permits ‘the reaching out . . . in every
conceivable case where injustice might result if the default were not
opened.’” 33 It further explained that the imposition of a “reasonable
excuse” requirement to the “proper case” ground for opening default arose
from a misreading of the Brucker v. O'Connor 34 case by the court of
appeals in BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Future Comms., Inc., 35
in which the supreme court “held that a default may be opened under
that ground ‘only where a reasonable explanation for the failure to timely
answer exists.’” 36
The court in Bowen held that the court of appeals’ holding in
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. is inconsistent with the statute’s
directive that a trial court consider “all the facts” in determining whether
a “proper case” exists. 37 The court reasoned that “[r]equiring a
‘reasonable excuse’ to open default under the proper case ground is thus
unsupported by the statutory language and further, would render the
proper case ground ‘mere surplusage’ by subsuming that ground into the
excusable neglect ground” 38 which has long “refer[ed] to cases where
there is a reasonable excuse for failing to answer.” 39
C. Direct Actions
In Daily Underwriters of America v. Williams, 40 the Georgia Court of
Appeals addressed whether the direct action provision of O.C.G.A.

31 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55(b); see also Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 547,
629 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2006).
32 Bowen, 308 Ga. at 204, 839 S.E.2d at 547.
33 Id. at 208, 839 S.E.2d at 550 (internal citations omitted).
34 115 Ga. 95, 41 S.E. 245 (1902), overruled by Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235
Ga. 201, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975).
35 293 Ga. App. 247, 666 S.E.2d 699 (2008).
36 Bowen, 308 Ga. at 208, 839 S.E.2d at 550 (quoting BellSouth, 293 Ga. App. at 250,
666 S.E.2d at 702).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Brucker, 115 Ga. at 96, 41 S.E. at 246.
40 354 Ga. App. 551, 841 S.E.2d 135 (2020) (McMillian, J., concurring specially) (Phipps,
S.A.J. dissenting) (noting Georgia Court of Appeals Rule 33.2(a) (2020), case is physical
precedent only).
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§ 40-2-140 41 permitted plaintiffs to sue insurers for motor carriers
engaged in purely interstate commerce. 42 After suffering injuries in a
wreck involving a tractor-trailer, the plaintiffs filed suit against the
tractor-trailer driver, the employer motor carrier, and the motor carrier’s
liability insurer. 43 The plaintiffs relied on O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) 44 as
authorizing their direct action claims against the motor carrier’s liability
insurer. 45 The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing the
plaintiffs’ direct action claims should be dismissed because the motor
carrier defendant was an interstate motor carrier and the statute relied
upon by plaintiffs, O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c), applies only to insurers of
motor carriers engaged in intrastate activity. 46 The plaintiffs argued in
response that O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140, although not cited in their complaint,
authorized the plaintiffs’ direct action claims against the insurer. The
trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and denied the insurer’s motion for
summary judgment. 47 The court of appeals granted the insurer’s
application for interlocutory review but ultimately affirmed the trial
court’s denial of summary judgment. 48
The court of appeals held that O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140(d)(4) 49 permits a
plaintiff injured by an interstate motor carrier to pursue a direct action
claim against the motor carrier’s liability insurer. 50 The court reiterated
that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 51 does not authorize direct action claims against
insurers of motor carriers engaged in purely interstate commerce since
the provisions of that title expressly do not apply to motor carriers
engaged in purely interstate commerce. 52 The court further held that a
plaintiff does not waive its direct action claim against the liability insurer
of a motor carrier engaged in purely interstate commerce by failing to
include in the complaint a citation to O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140 if the complaint

41 O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140 (2020). “Any person having a cause of action, whether arising in
tort or contract, under this Code section may join in the same cause of action the motor
carrier and its insurance carrier.” (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140(c)(4)).
42 Daily, 354 Ga. App. at 557, 841 S.E.2d at 141.
43 Id. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 137.
44 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) (2020) (providing “it shall be permissible under this part for
any person having a cause of action arising under this part to join in the same action the
motor carrier and the insurance carrier, whether arising in tort or contract”). Id.
45 Daily, 354 Ga. App. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 137.
46 Id. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 137–38.
47 Id. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 138.
48 Id.
49 O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140(d)(4) (2020).
50 Daily, 354 Ga. App. at 558, 841 S.E.2d at 141.
51 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 (2020).
52 Daily, 354 Ga. App. at 553, 841 S.E.2d at 138 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-1-126).
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puts the liability insurer on notice that a direct action claim is being
asserted. 53
D. Evidence and Expert Testimony
In Lee v. Smith, 54 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a trial court
abuses its discretion by excluding an expert witness “solely because the
witness was identified after the deadline set in a scheduling, discovery,
and/or case management order.” 55 Although Lee involved the exclusion of
an expert witness, the court’s holding broadly applies to any witness
excluded solely because the witness was belatedly disclosed. 56
In addition to holding that trial courts are not permitted to exclude a
witness because the witness was disclosed in violation of a scheduling
order, the court established four factors that a trial court must analyze
when deciding whether to exclude a witness in these circumstances. 57
Relying on state and federal authority from other jurisdictions, the court
held that those factors include: “(1) the explanation for the failure to
disclose the witness, (2) the importance of the testimony, . . . (3) the
prejudice to the opposing party if the witness [is] allowed to testify,” and
(4) whether a less harsh remedy than the exclusion of the witness would
be sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice and vindicate the trial court’s
authority. 58 Although the court emphasized that these four factors
“should be considered in all cases where a witness is disclosed in an
untimely manner in violation of a court-imposed deadline,” the court
noted that “additional factors might also be appropriate to consider in
unusual or extraordinary cases.” 59
In reaching its holding, the court explicitly overruled several Georgia
Court of Appeals decisions that “can be read to support the proposition
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding a witness
solely because the witness was . . . [disclosed in violation of a scheduling
order].” 60
53 Id. at 556–57, 841 S.E.2d at 140–41 (Phipps, S.J., dissenting specially). Id. at 559–60,
841 S.E.2d at 142 (Phipps, J., dissenting). A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the
Supreme Court of Georgia on May 28, 2020. That petition was still pending at the time this
Article was submitted for publishing.
54 307 Ga. 815, 838 S.E.2d 870 (2020).
55 Id. at 822–23, 838 S.E.2d at 876.
56 Id. at 823–24, 838 S.E.2d at 877.
57 Id. at 823, 838 S.E.2d at 877.
58 Id. at 823–24, 838 S.E.2d at 877 (alteration in original).
59 Id. at 824 n.5, 838 S.E.2d at 878 n.5.
60 Id. at 822–23, 838 S.E.2d at 876–77 (citing Moore v. Cottrell, Inc., 334 Ga. App. 791,
780 S.E.2d 442 (2015); Kohler v. Van Peteghem, 330 Ga. App. 230, 767 S.E.2d 775 (2014);
Vaughan v. WellStar Health System, 304 Ga. App. 596, 601–02, 696 S.E.2d 506 (2010);
Collins v. Dickman, 295 Ga. App. 601, 603–04, 672 S.E.2d 433 (2008)).
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In Cham v. ECI Management Corp., 61 the Georgia Court of Appeals
reaffirmed that evidence of a party’s wealth or financial status is no
longer “categorically inadmissible” in cases in which punitive damages
are not in issue. 62 Analyzing the Georgia Supreme Court's recent decision
in Chrysler Group v. Walden, 63 the court of appeals explained that “the
admissibility of party-wealth evidence is a fact-specific analysis in which
the trial court must determine whether the evidence is relevant under
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401 (‘Rule 401’) and more prejudicial than probative
under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403 (‘Rule 403’).” 64
In Cham, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the
owner and manager of an apartment complex where a family member
was killed during a robbery in 2015. 65 At trial, counsel for the owner and
manager of the apartment complex argued in opening statement that in
the years immediately preceding the killing “they went from ‘spending
17 to $18,000 a year [on security] to spending $62,000 a year, 100, 200,
300 percent [increase].’” 66 In response, the plaintiffs’ counsel attempted
to elicit testimony that the defendants’ spending on security was a
relatively small percentage of their overall budget, but the trial court
sustained an objection to this line of questioning on the grounds that it
impermissibly sought testimony regarding “the financial worth of the
Defendant[s].” 67 The jury rendered a verdict for the defense. 68
Although the court of appeals reversed the verdict for the defense and
remanded on other grounds, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that
evidence regarding the percentage of the defendants’ overall budget
devoted to security was not categorically inadmissible as party-wealth
evidence. 69 The court of appeals emphasized that “Georgia’s common law
rule relating to the relevance of party-wealth evidence is no longer in
force,” in light of the enactment of Georgia’s 2013 Evidence Code. 70 The
court of appeals then explained that “[o]n remand, the trial court should
first determine whether the evidence is relevant to an issue in this case,”
and “[i]f so, the trial court should then conduct a balanc[e] of the evidence

353 Ga. App. 162, 836 S.E.2d 555 (2019).
Id. at 171, 836 S.E.2d at 563.
63 303 Ga. 358, 812 S.E.2d 244 (2018).
64 Cham, 353 Ga. App. at 171, 836 S.E.2d at 563 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 and
24-4-403 (2020)).
65 Id. at 162, 836 S.E.2d at 557.
66 Id. at 168, 836 S.E.2d at 561 (third alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
67 Id. at 168–71, 836 S.E.2d at 561–63.
68 Id. at 162, 836 S.E.2d at 557–58.
69 Id. at 171–72, 836 S.E.2d at 563.
70 Id.
61
62
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under Rule 403, determining whether the probative value of the evidence
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 71
E. Professional Negligence
In Lowndes County Health Services, LLC v. Copeland, 72 the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s ruling that claims arising from
the failure to properly staff the night shift at a skilled nursing facility
sound in ordinary negligence rather than professional negligence. 73 On
October 26, 2012, Bobby Copeland died from complications related to a
bowel obstruction while in the care of Heritage Healthcare at Holly Hill
(Holly Hill), a skilled nursing facility in Valdosta. 74 The evidence showed
that a licensed practical nurse (LPN) who worked the night shift at Holly
Hill discovered Copeland had vomited on himself and had a “slightly
distended” stomach with no bowel sounds in three of four quadrants
around 10:45 PM on October 25. 75 The LPN called the physician’s
assistant for Holly Hill’s medical director, relayed her observations, and
asked if Copeland should go to the hospital. The physician’s assistant
said not to send Copeland to the hospital and instead ordered a blood
test, abdominal x-ray, and anti-nausea medication. Around 10:15 a.m.
the following morning, Copeland, whose symptoms persisted, was
examined by the physician’s assistant. Forty-five minutes later,
Copeland was transported by ambulance to the emergency department
at South Georgia Medical Center. Around 5:30 p.m., Copeland was
transferred to the intensive care unit where he died a few hours later. 76
Copeland’s son and the administrator of his estate sued Holly Hill for
causing Copeland’s death. 77 A jury awarded the plaintiffs over $7.5
million in compensatory damages and found Holly Hill liable for both
ordinary and professional negligence. 78 On appeal, Holly Hill challenged
the trial court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict on the plaintiffs’
negligent staffing claim. 79 The plaintiffs alleged that Holly Hill
negligently staffed the night shift on October 25, 2012, because no one
there could properly assess Copeland’s condition. 80 The plaintiffs
asserted this was an ordinary negligence claim, but Holly Hill argued
Id. at 172, 836 S.E.2d at 563.
352 Ga. App. 233, 834 S.E.2d 322 (2019).
73 Id. at 239, 834 S.E.2d at 327.
74 Id. at 233–34, 834 S.E.2d at 324–25.
75 Id. at 233–34, 834 S.E.2d at 324.
76 Id. at 234, 834 S.E.2d at 324–25.
77 Id. at 233, 834 S.E.2d at 324.
78 Id. at 234, 834 S.E.2d at 325.
79 Id. at 237, 834 S.E.2d at 326.
80 Id. at 238, 834 S.E.2d at 326–27.
71
72

320

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

that the claim sounded in professional negligence and, thus, had to be
supported by expert evidence, which the plaintiffs did not present,
because staffing decisions involved “professional nursing judgment.” 81
The trial court disagreed, and the court of appeals affirmed. 82
While the evidence showed that a registered nurse made the
overnight-staffing schedule, those staffing decisions were based on what
Holly Hill had done historically and the judgment of the scheduling nurse
“in collaboration with the facility administrator” responsible for Holly
Hill’s overall operation. 83 As a result and as usual, no registered nurses
were scheduled to work the night shift on October 25, meaning no one
“qualified to perform an independent nursing assessment of a resident’s
medical condition” was on duty. 84 At trial, Holly Hill adduced no evidence
that the final decision about how many registered nurses were available
to schedule on the night shift was made by a medical professional or
constituted a medical decision, rather than a business decision based on
the comparative cost of paying registered nurses to work. 85 Because the
limited availability of registered nurses was the product of
“business-related ordinary negligence,” the court of appeals held the trial
court properly concluded that the plaintiffs’ negligent staffing claim
sounded in ordinary rather than professional negligence. 86
F. Punitive Damages
In Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 87 the Georgia Supreme Court considered
whether punitive damages are recoverable under the current abusive
litigation statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-80 through 51-7-85, 88 enacted in
1989. 89 Those statutes permit a victim of abusive litigation to recover “all
damages allowed by law as proven by the evidence, including costs and
expenses of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.” 90 After examining
the plain text of the statutes, reviewing the common law at the time of
enactment, and considering the possibility of double recovery, the court
unanimously held that a plaintiff can recover punitive damages in a

Id. at 238, 834 S.E.2d at 327.
Id. at 238–39, 834 S.E.2d at 327.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 238, 834 S.E.2d at 327.
85 Id. at 239, 834 S.E.2d at 327.
86 Id.
87 307 Ga. 826, 838 S.E.2d 860 (2020).
88 O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-80 through 51-7-85 (2020).
89 Ga. S. Bill 239, Reg. Sess., 1989 Ga. Laws 408 (Codified at O.C.G.A §§ 51-7-80 through
51-7-85 (2020)).
90 O.C.G.A. § 51-7-83(a) (2020).
81
82
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statutory abusive litigation action if the plaintiff is not seeking relief
solely for injury to peace, happiness, and feelings. 91
The plaintiff in Coen was fired from CDC Software in April 2012.
After his firing, he sued CDC Software for breach of his employment
contract. 92 In reaction to several claims and defenses asserted by CDC in
response to his complaint, Coen sent an abusive litigation letter to CDC
Software, Aptean, and their counsel giving them, as required by the
abusive litigation statutes, an opportunity to drop the claims and
defenses that “lacked substantial justification.” 93 As a result, the
defendants dropped some but not all claims and defenses which Coen
asserted were without merit. 94 “In April 2014, the trial court granted . . .
partial summary judgment” to Coen, ruling the employment contract was
“valid and enforceable” and that CDC Software had no basis for not
paying him. 95
Coen then moved under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) 96 and O.C.G.A.
§ 9-15-14(b) 97 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The trial court
granted Coen’s motion, awarded him $176,484.80, and held CDC
Software, Aptean, and their counsel, jointly and severally liable for the
damages. In September 2014, Coen dismissed all remaining claims with
prejudice. 98
After filing three separate abusive litigation lawsuits in 2015, Coen
dismissed those actions and filed a renewal action in September 2016,
naming all parties from the three prior cases. 99 In the renewal action,
Coen sought “damages for injury to his peace, happiness, or feelings;
punitive damages; and attorney[’s] fees for the pending action.” 100 The
trial court dismissed Coen’s renewal action, as relevant here, because it
ruled that punitive damages were unavailable in an abusive litigation
action. 101 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 102 The
Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded. 103
The supreme court held that punitive damages are available in an
abusive-ligation action based on the plain text of O.C.G.A. § 51-7-83(a):
Coen, 307 Ga. at 826–27, 838 S.E.2d at 861.
Id. at 827, 838 S.E.2d at 861.
93 Id. at 827 n.2, 838 S.E.2d at 861 n.2.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 827, 838 S.E.2d at 861.
96 O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (2020).
97 O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2020).
98 Coen, 307 Ga. at 827, 838 S.E.2d at 861.
99 Id. at 827–28, 838 S.E.2d at 861.
100 Id. at 828, 838 S.E.2d at 861.
101 Id. at 828, 838 S.E.2d at 862.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 828–29, 840–41, 838 S.E.2d at 862, 869–70.
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“‘[a] plaintiff who prevails in an action under this article shall be entitled
to all damages allowed by law as proven by the evidence, including costs
and expenses of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.’” 104 The court
noted that it “must also consider the legal context in which this statutory
text was enacted in 1989.” 105 After surveying the common law, the court
concluded that punitive damages were generally available in common
law abusive litigation actions if the plaintiffs did not seek damages solely
for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings. 106 Having concluded that the
abusive litigation statutes generally permit recovery of punitive
damages, the supreme court remanded the case so that the lower courts
could consider whether Coen had satisfied other prerequisites to proceed
with his claims. 107
G. Service of Process
In Henderson v. James, 108 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
whether service by publication was sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over the defendant in a pending tort action. 109 The plaintiff
in Henderson filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant
arising out of an October 4, 2016 car wreck that occurred in Ware County.
The initial complaint alleged that the defendant resided in Ware
County. 110 After the plaintiff was unable to locate or personally serve the
defendant, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the
defendant had “apparently departed . . . Ware County and the State of
Georgia.” 111 The trial court subsequently authorized service by
publication and after the statute of limitations expired, the defendant’s
insurer filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of the defendant, arguing that
service by publication was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. 112 After the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, the court of appeals granted an application for discretionary
review to determine whether the trial court erred. 113
“[T]he general rule in Georgia is that service by publication does not
confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a tort action.” 114 An
Id. at 829, 838 S.E.2d at 862 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-7-83(a)).
Id. at 832, 838 S.E.2d at 864.
106 Id. at 837, 838 S.E.2d at 867–68.
107 Id. at 840–41, 838 S.E.2d at 870.
108 350 Ga. App. 361, 829 S.E.2d 429 (2019).
109 Id. at 365, 829 S.E.2d at 433.
110 Id. at 361, 829 S.E.2d at 431.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 362–63, 829 S.E.2d at 431–32.
113 Id. at 361, 829 S.E.2d at 430–31.
114 Id. at 364, 829 S.E.2d at 433.
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established but narrow exception to this general rule exists where there
is evidence that the defendant (1) resides within the trial court’s
jurisdiction; (2) has actual knowledge of the lawsuit; and (3) “willfully
secrets himself” as a means to frustrate and avoid personal service
efforts. 115 The court of appeals held in Henderson that this exception was
inapplicable under the facts of the case because “the record contain[ed]
no evidence whatsoever that [defendant] ha[d] actual knowledge of the
lawsuit pending against him[,]” and the amended complaint alleged the
defendant no longer resided in the trial court’s jurisdiction. 116
Accordingly, service by publication did not confer personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, and the court of appeals held that the trial court
erred in denying the motion to dismiss filed on the defendant’s behalf. 117
H. Statutes of Limitation
In Langley v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 118 the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals and held that a residential lease
agreement containing a one-year limitation period for asserting “any
legal action” did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a premises
liability tort claim outside the agreed upon one-year limitation period. 119
The court explained that the lease agreement’s “Limitation Provision”
must be read “in light of the contract as a whole and in the legal context
in which it was created.” 120
The purpose and intent of the lease agreement was to create a
landlord-tenant relationship. 121 Because the “Limitation Provision” “is
found near the end of a contract establishing a lease agreement[,]” it was
unclear “whether [the phrase] ‘any legal action’ should be given its literal
meaning, or whether the parties intended to limit its application to
lawsuits arising from the lease agreement.” 122 In light of this ambiguity,
the court determined that “the agreement must be construed against [the
apartment complex], the drafter, and in favor of [the plaintiff], the
non-drafter.” 123 The court noted that the plaintiff’s lawsuit “is not legally

Id. (quoting Melton v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 400, 403, 249 S.E.2d 82 (1978)).
Id. at 365, 829 S.E.2d at 433.
117 Id.
118 307 Ga. 321, 834 S.E.2d 800 (2019).
119 Id. at 321, 834 S.E.2d at 802. The relevant underlying facts and a summary of the
Georgia Court of Appeals decision can be found in Mercer Law Review’s 2018 Annual
Survey of Georgia Law. See Brandon L. Peak et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 70 Mercer L. Rev. 253, 269–70 (2018).
120 Langley, 307 Ga. at 325, 834 S.E.2d at 805.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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predicated on the landlord-tenant relationship between . . . [the
parties].” 124 Instead, the plaintiff’s tort claim is “predicated on [the
defendant apartment complex]’s status as a property owner and [the
plaintiff]’s status as an invitee on that property. The relationship
between an owner and an invitee is separate from the relationship
between a landlord and a tenant.” 125
Viewed in this context, the ultimate question was whether the parties
to the agreement intended for the “Limitation Provision . . . to apply to
the conceivable universe of legal claims that may arise between the
parties, or is its applicability limited to claims arising from the lease
agreement.” 126 The court concluded that the “Limitation Provision” was
limited to claims arising from the lease agreement and did not apply to
tort claims independent of the lease agreement, such as the plaintiff’s
premises liability claim. 127
IV. CONCLUSION
The above cases and legislation have, in the Authors’ estimation, most
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia during the
Survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive of
all legal developments for this topic.

Id. at 326, 834 S.E.2d at 805.
Id. at 326, 834 S.E.2d at 805–06.
126 Id. at 327, 834 S.E.2d at 806.
127 Id. The court observed:
It is difficult to believe, for example, that the parties intended the Limitation
Provision to apply to tort claims resulting from a traffic accident miles away
from the apartment complex between Langley’s and the property manager’s
vehicles, an intentional tort lawsuit against a property manager for punching a
tenant, or a shareholder liability suit if Langley happened to be a shareholder in
MP Spring Lake, LLC. (1) Instead, when read in the context of the lease
agreement, we conclude that the general language “any legal action,” in the
absence of language specifically encompassing tort claims, is limited to claims
arising out of the lease agreement.
Id. Because the lease agreement’s “Limitation Provision” did not specifically apply to
the plaintiff’s premises liability claim, the court did “not reach the question of whether that
provision was enforceable” as to such claims. Id. at 328, 834 S.E.2d at 807–08.
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